In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a behavioral refinement and stability measure that is meant to predict actual behavior in a wide range of cheap talk games. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and size of credible deviations. ACDC organizes the results from cheap talk experiments well, even in cases where other criteria remain silent.
Introduction
showed how meaningful costless communication between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver can be supported in equilibrium. Their seminal paper inspired many applications ranging from the presidential veto (Matthews, 1989) , legislative committees (Gilligan & Krehbiel, 1990 ) and political correctness (Morris, 2001) to double auctions (Matthews & Postlewaite (1989) ; Farrell & Gibbons (1989) ), stock recommendations (Morgan & Stocken, 2003) and matching markets (Coles, Kushnir & Niederle, 2010) .
These cheap talk games are characterized by multiple equilibria which differ crucially in their prediction about how much information will be transmitted.
Several refinements have been proposed to select an equilibrium in cheap talk games. Often, such refinements were based on an intuitive notion of how rational players would reason in the context of a particular set of cheap talk games. 1 For instance, Farrell (1993) and Matthews, Okuno-Fujiwara & Postlewaite (1991) formulated refinements in which equilibria are discarded if they allow senders to submit credible deviating messages. 2 Unfortunately, both Farrell's neologism proofness and Matthews et al.'s (strong) announcement proofness criteria eliminate all equilibria in many games, including the original Crawford-Sobel game. 3 Several other types of concepts have been proposed that distinguish between stable and unstable equilibria (or profiles), such as Partial Common Interest (PCI) (Blume, Kim & Sobel, 1993) , the recurrent mop (Rabin & Sobel, 1996) and No Incentive To Separate (NITS) (Chen, Kartik & Sobel, 2008) . These criteria often select a plausible equilibrium in specific settings, but fail to discriminate successfully across a wider range of cheap talk games.
In this paper, we propose a behavioral refinement that is meant to predict actual behavior in a wide range of cheap talk applications. Our Average Credi-ble Deviation Criterion (ACDC) is based on credible deviations but allows for a continuous instead of a binary stability concept. Its main contribution to the literature is that it works: it makes a prediction in many games and its predictions are validated by experimental evidence.
ACDC takes as a point of departure a theory of credible deviations like credible neologisms proofness (Farrell, 1993) or credible announcements (Matthews, Okuno-Fujiwara & Postlewaite, 1991) . These theories stipulate conditions under which a message inducing a deviation from equilibrium is credible and thus upsets the equilibrium. The current approach is to assume that all equilibria that admit credible deviations are equally unstable. ACDC, however, assumes that the stability of an equilibrium is a decreasing function of its Average Credible Deviation (ACD), a measure of the frequency and intensity of credible deviations. The ACD measures the mass of types that can credibly deviate and the size of those induced deviations (as measured by the difference in Sender payoff between the equilibrium and deviating action). Comparable equilibria will perform better if they have a lower ACD on this account. In particular, we call an equilibrium that minimizes the ACD in a game an 'ACDC equilibrium.' This allows us to select equilibria, even in games where no equilibrium is completely stable.
We think ACDC provides an intuitive solution to the equilibrium selection problem for cheap talk games. Human behavior is messy and seldom completely in (or out of) equilibrium. Still, neologism proofness, announcement proofness, and many of the other cheap talk refinements impose a neat binary distinction between stable and unstable equilibria. Whereas such a binary criterion is appropriate for rational agents, it may unnecessarily lose predictive power when applied to human behavior. ACDC solves this problem in two ways. It is able to select among equilibria in a wide range of games and it provides a continuous stability measure for each equilibrium.
We derive the following results. First, we show that an ACDC equilibrium exists under general conditions. In all applications we have come along, there is a unique ACDC equilibrium. Second and more importantly, the predictions of ACDC are validated by existing experiments as well as by new experimental data. Wherever experimental evidence exists, the predictions of ACDC are in line with the data: it performs at least as well as other criteria, if they are predictive, and also makes predictions when other criteria are silent. We show that ACDC selects the unique maximum size equilibrium in the leading uniform-quadratic case of the Crawford-Sobel game for a large range of bias parameters. Until now, only NITS was able to select this equilibrium in the Crawford-Sobel setting (Chen, Kartik & Sobel, 2008) . In addition, the maximum size equilibrium becomes more stable as the bias parameter becomes smaller according to ACDC, which is not predicted by existing criteria. Both results are supported by experimental work on (discrete) Crawford-Sobel games (Dickhaut, McCabe & Mukherji (1995) , Cai & Wang (2006) , Wang, Spezio & Camerer (2010) ).
Furthermore, we find that ACDC organizes the main features of the experimental data of the discrete games analyzed by Blume, DeJong, Kim & Sprinkle (2001) , originally intended to test the Partial Common Interest criterion. Finally, ACDC is also successful in organizing the results of new experiments. In De Groot Ruiz, Offerman & Onderstal (2012a), we test the predictions of ACDC in a class of veto-threat games introduced in De Groot Ruiz, Offerman & Onderstal (2012b) . The data corroborate the predictions of ACDC. The ACDC equilibrium performs better in games where its ACD is smaller. In addition, in each treatment the ACDC equilibrium predicts best, also in games where all other criteria do not select a unique equilibrium. This paper has the following structure. In section 2, we motivate, define and illustrate ACDC. In section 3, we apply ACDC to the Crawford-Sobel uniformquadratic model and compare it to other concepts in this framework. In section 4, we discuss the remaining experimental evidence on ACDC. Finally, section 5 concludes.
Motivation, Definition, Properties, and Applications

Motivation
Applied theorists who analyze strategic information transmission face the following problem if they analyze a new cheap talk game. The model is likely to have several equilibria and so one would like a concept that selects the most plausible equilibrium, tells one how stable that equilibrium is, and is validated by experimental data. However, currently chances are high that one will not find such a concept for the new cheap talk game for two reasons.
First, existing selection criteria tend to select an equilibrium in specific classes of games but not in all relevant applications. Neologism proofness (Farrell, 1993) and announcement proofness (Matthews, Okuno-Fujiwara & Postlewaite, 1991 ) provide a strong intuition and make meaningful predictions in specific simple discrete games. However, they fail to select an equilibrium in many applied settings, such as that of Crawford and Sobel (1982) . In contrast, NITS is very effective in selecting equilibria in the Crawford-Sobel model (Chen, Kartik & Sobel, 2008) . The predictions by NITS have been validated by experimental evidence on the Crawford-Sobel model (Dickhaut, McCabe & Mukherji (1995) ; Cai & Wang (2006) ; Wang, Spezio & Camerer (2010) ). However, in other games, NITS is often not defined, as we will discuss in section 3. PCI has shown to make a prediction which is borne out by experimental data in particular discrete games (Blume, DeJong, Kim & Sprinkle, 2001 ), but does not select a partition in many continuous settings, such as that of Crawford-Sobel. Second, even if current concepts select an equilibrium, they do not tell how stable it is, even though experimental evidence suggest there is a considerable degree of variation in the stability of cheap talk equilibria. For instance, experiments on (discrete versions of) the Crawford-Sobel game show that the most informative NITS equilibrium indeed performs best, but that its stability decreases considerably as the bias parameter increases. Table 1 illustrates these two issues of selection and stability. In Game A, the Sender sends a costless message m to the Receiver, who then takes one of three actions: 1 2 , a a or 3 . a 4 The payoffs for both players depend on the Receiver's action and the Sender's type. The Sender's type is private information and is drawn from 1 t and 2 t each with probability (1 ) / 2 and from 3 t with probability .
Game A in
Notes: The left column shows the Sender's type and between brackets the probability that it is drawn. The top row shows the Receiver's actions. The remaining cells provide the Sender's payoff in the first entry and the Receiver's payoffs in the second entry. and 0 1 Game A has two equilibria. We say a type t induces action a, if the Receiver always takes action a after any message t sends in equilibrium. In the pooling equilibrium, all Senders induce 5 . a In the partially separating equilibrium, 1 t induces 1 , a whereas 2 t and 3 t induce 4 . a
What do credible neologisms (Farrell, 1993) For entirely rational agents, the fact that neither equilibrium is stable might be all there is to be said. When explaining or predicting human behavior, however, we feel we can go further. Human behavior is hardly ever completely in or out of equilibrium, and by imposing a binary distinction between stable and unstable equilibria a concept may lose predictive power. 6
In game A, even though the partially separating equilibrium is not entirely stable, it seems more plausible than the pooling equilibrium if either 3 t is infrequent ( small) or 3 t has a very small incentive to deviate ( small). If is small, then the partially separating equilibrium will be upset with a small probability, whereas the pooling equilibrium will be upset almost half of the time. Similarly, if is small, then 3 t has a small incentive to deviate in the partially separating equilibrium and may choose to stick to it, lest she be misunderstood and get a payoff lower than she gets by sticking to equilibrium.
Hence, we would expect to observe behavior close to the partially separating 6 We consider equilibrium to be most meaningful in a dynamic context, where members of a group interact frequently with different other members. In this context language evolves and behavior is shaped by strategic forces in the direction of equilibrium. For a one-shot game between rational individuals without social information, an approach based on rationalizability and some focal meaning of messages, such as that in Rabin (1990) , may be appropriate. equilibrium more frequently than behavior close to the pooling equilibrium. This implies two things. First, it may be possible to select the most plausible equilibrium in a game, even though no equilibrium exists that is entirely stable. Second, to describe behavior in a cheap talk game one needs a continuous stability measure and not just a binary criterion.
Definition and General Results
Our intuition is that, from a behavioral perspective, the stability of an equilibrium is a decreasing function of the average intensity of the credible deviations it admits. This depends, firstly, on the mass of types that can credibly induce a deviation and, secondly, on the intensity of the deviation, measured by the incentive the Sender has to deviate. As a consequence, if the deviating mass and the induced deviations from equilibrium are small, the equilibrium is likely to be a good predictor of behavior. We formalize this intuition in the ACDC criterion.
We first provide a definition of ACDC and apply it to the Crawford-Sobel game in the following section.
For simplicity, we define ACDC for Sender-Receiver games and pure strategies. 7 Nature draws the Sender type t from probability density f on T, where T is a compact metric space. The Sender then privately observes her type t and chooses a costless message . m M After having observed the Sender's message, We then define the Average Credible Deviation (ACD) of an equilibrium relative to as:
(
measures the intensity of type t's credible deviation. This captures the likelihood of a particular deviation and the degree to which a deviation upsets the equilibrium. We have selected an intensity measure on the following grounds. It should be -invariant to affine transformations of payoffs; -increasing in the difference between the deviating and equilibrium payoff;
Additionally, we think it is desirable that it is decreasing in the lowest rationalizable payoff, as that measures how risky it is to deviate from equilibrium for the Sender. Finally, we think it is convenient to normalize it so that it is 0 if the difference between deviating and equilibrium payoff is zero and 1 if the difference between deviating and equilibrium payoff is maximal. Specifications of ( , ) CD t that adhere to the properties above are likely to lead to similar conclusions. We propose the following simple function for ( , ) CD t . Let † be the set of rationalizable strategy profiles. Then, †
are the lowest and highest rationalizable payoff for Sender type t. Then
as in this case the Sender has no incentive to adhere to her equilibrium strategy.
A deviation theory can be based on credible neologisms or some form of credible announcements (or, in principle, on any theory of credible deviations). Our preference is to employ credible neologisms. 9 In our view, the simplicity of neologism proofness makes it the most apt to describe the behavior of boundedly rational individuals. We agree with the observations in Matthews, Okuno-Fujiwara & Postlewaite (1991) about the limitations of neologism proofness for rational agents. However, the motivation behind ACDC is to predict behavior and explain experimental data. Hence, our aim is somewhat different from that of most of the credible deviations literature, whose main concern is to establish what would be credible from a rational perspective.
In the case of full rationality, strongly credible announcements are probably the proper basis for a deviation theory, as these are credible even if players anticipate deviations. Credible neologisms assume that players do not anticipate deviations and hence assume some form of bounded rationality. Nonetheless, in almost all games strongly credible announcements predict that all equilibria are stable, which is clearly not what the empirical data shows. A reason may well lie in the bounded rationality of most people. Estimations of level-k reasoning and cognitive hierarchies of human data in experiments show that in most games the large majority of people engage in level-1 and level-2 reasoning (Nagel, 1995; Camerer, Ho, & Chong, 2004) . Cai & Wang (1996) find specifically in a Crawford-Sobel game that the majority of people do not exceed level-2 reasoning.
Determining the credibility of an out-of-equilibrium message also requires quite a bit of strategic sophistication. In analogy to a level-k analysis, one can get a feel for this by looking at how deep people must reason in order to find a particular deviation credible. In a level-k model, players without strategic sophistication ('level-0') will send nor understand deviations. Players with elementary strategic sophistication ('level-1') can understand deviations. However, they will not send them, as they believe they will not be understood. Nor will they anticipate them. Players with a decent amount of strategic sophistication ('level-2') will send credible deviations; but they will not anticipate them.
Only sophisticated players ('level-3') will anticipate credible deviations but even they do not expect others to anticipate credible deviations. Very sophisticated players ('level-4') anticipate credible deviations and anticipate that others anticipate them as well. In line with results on strategic reasoning in previous experiments, we expect that credible neologisms and weakly credible announcements (and ACDC with respect to them) come closest to describing the behavior of the large majority of people. Thus, most boundedly rational Receivers will not deviate from equilibrium unless they receive a credible deviation. This means that the assumption implicit in ACDC that an equilibrium is only destabilized if the Sender sends a credible deviation, can be taken as a good approximation of behavior.
Based on the ACD, we formulate the ACD-Criterion (ACDC), which says that an equilibrium will on average predict better than equilibrium if ( ) ( ) ACD ACD . In particular, based on ACDC we can formulate the following selection criterion:
Definition 1 An equilibrium is an ACDC equilibrium relative to deviation
Note that this selection criterion selects the equilibrium that will predict best on average rather than the equilibrium that will always be played. A simple implication is that is an ACDC equilibrium if ( ) .
The following result is immediate.
Proposition 1 If the number of equilibrium outcomes is finite, the cheap talk game has an ACDC equilibrium relative to .
Hence, existence of an ACDC equilibrium is guaranteed by a finite set of equilibrium-outcomes. This is a relevant result, as Park (1997) has shown that finite Sender-Receiver games have a finite set of equilibrium outcomes under generic conditions. Before, Crawford and Sobel (1982) Proposition 2 is informative for continuous games for which the equilibrium outcome set is known but not finite. This proposition implies that continuous games with an equilibrium set consisting of partition equilibria that are wellbehaved with respect to their ACD will have an ACDC equilibrium. 10 For instance, the class of continuous veto-threats games we introduce in De Groot Ruiz, Onderstal and Offerman (2012b) and for which we derive the ACDC equilibrium in Online Appendix B has an infinite equilibrium outcome set that meets the conditions of Proposition 2.
Applying ACDC
We will now apply ACDC to Game A in Table 1 and to Cai & Wang's (1996) discrete versions of the Crawford-Sobel game. In a discrete game, the ACD of a pure equilibrium (with a pure ( )) reduces to
where ( ) f t is type t's prior probability. Recall that in Game A in the pooling equilibrium, all Senders induce 5 a and 4 2 3 , { , } a t t is the unique credible neologism. Hence, the ACD of the pooling equilibrium is (1 ) (2 1) 2 2 0 2 1 2 0 1 2 . 4 8 4
In the partially separating equilibrium 1 t induces 1 , a whereas 2 t and 3 t induce 4 a and 3 3 , { } a t is admitted. Hence, the ACD of the partially separating equilibrium is
It is readily verified that the pooling equilibrium's ACD is greater than the partially separating equilibrium's so that the latter is the ACDC equilibrium. In addition, the ACD 10 An equilibrium of a game with a one-dimensional type and action set is a partition equilibrium if there exists a partition 0 Table 2 . Applying ACDC to the discrete Crawford-Sobel games is straightforward. For example, for b = 2, the ACD of the pooling equilibrium is 1 (5,5) (5,7) (7,5) (7,7) (9,5) (9,7) 5
(5,7) (5,1) (7,9) (7,1) (9,9) (9,1)
In Table 2 , we provide the ACD of each equilibrium for the treatments of Cai and Wang (2006) . ACDC makes two predictions in line with the experimental data. First, ACDC selects the most informative equilibrium. Second, the most informative equilibrium has a lower ACD and thus becomes more stable as b becomes smaller and the reverse holds for the pooling equilibrium. Both predictions are intuitive. The most informative equilibrium admits 'fewer' or 'smaller' credible deviations than the pooling equilibrium for all values of b in Table 2 .
This could provide an explanation why it predicts better. ( , ) 110 10 .
S U a t t b a
The type set is {1,3,5,7,9}, the action set is {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}.
Each type is equally likely. 1 In the pooling equilibrium, the Receiver takes action 5 regardless of the message. 2 The baseline treatments only differ in the size of the bias parameter b. 3 As prediction error we take the reported difference between the actual and predicted message-type correlation. Cai and Wang also report other measures as message-action and typeaction correlations, which yield a similar picture. 4 In this column, we show the equilibrium type partition. The Receiver's action from a message coming from a partition element is the average of the types in the partition element.
In addition, as b increases, the most informative equilibrium admits 'more' or 'larger' credible deviations. This may explain the fact that the prediction error of the most informative equilibrium appears to become larger as b increases (and the pooling equilibrium appears to predict less bad). One particular feature of the instability of the most informative equilibrium is that unless it is perfectly separating, there appears to be overcommunication. One explanation for overcommunication could be due to lying averse Senders and/or naïve Receivers (Kartik, Ottaviani, & Squintani, 2007) . An additional explanation is that credible neologisms not only destabilize but also lead to more information transmission, as can be seen in Table 2 . For instance, if b = 4, the unique pooling equilibrium predicts no information transmission, but credible neolo-gisms allow types 3 to 9 to separate themselves from type 1 if equilibrium is reached.
Crawford-Sobel Game
In this section, we apply ACDC to the leading uniform-quadratic case of Crawford & Sobel's (1982) cheap talk game (henceforth 'CS game'). We compare its predictions to those of existing refinements.
In the CS game, types are uniformly distributed on [0,1], the action space is
capturing the Sender bias. Crawford & Sobel (1982) show that this game only has (perfect Bayesian) partition equilibria and that the maximum equilibrium size ( ) n b is the largest integer n for which (4) 2 ( 1) 1 n n b .
The game has a unique size-n equilibrium for each {1,..., ( )} n nb . Let (5) 2 ( ). need not exist. 12 Observe that 1 n n i i for 1,..., , i n so that none of the credible neologisms overlap. Figure   1 illustrates the results for 1 .
b
It seems intuitive that the highest size equilibrium is the ACDC equilibrium, since the deviations seem to get smaller and smaller as the size increases. This indeed turns out to be the case. Although one can obtain analytical results for the ACD for specific parameter values, finding the ACDC equilibrium for general b defies an analytical approach. Hence, we calculated the ACD for a very fine grid of b and obtain the following result. (
Equality 1 follows from the specification of S EU in Crawford & Sobel (1982) . the pooling equilibrium admits the weakly credible announcement composed of the neologisms at the beginning and end, characterized by the set of intervals of deviating Rabin & Sobel (1996) propose the recurrent mop criterion, which can select equilibria that, although not impervious to credible deviations, are likely to recur in the long run, because they are frequently deviated to. The authors restrict their definition of the recurrent mop to games with a finite number of actions as it may run into problems in continuous games, amongst others because the deviation correspondence may not converge in these settings. Blume, Kim & Sobel (1993) put forward the Partial Common Interest (PCI) concept. A partition of the typeset satisfies PCI "if types in each partition element unambiguously prefer to be identified as members of that element, and there is no finer partition with that property." PCI does not make a definite prediction in the CS game, as no partition of the type space (except
PCI. The main reason is that the highest Sender-type of a partition-element always prefers the Receiver to believe that the upper boundary is higher than the true boundary (except for type 1 t
).
Also non-equilibrium concepts exist. Rabin (1990) 
Since for all weakly credible announcements deviating types exist that prefer another weakly credible announcement, none is announcement proof. The size-2 and size-3 equilibria only admit weakly credible announcements composed of the non-overlapping credible neologisms, which are thus credible. Observe that the computational demands on agents to determine whether credible announcements exist and how they look like are quite high. 14 Rabin also introduces an equilibrium version of CMR, Credible Message Equilibria (CME), but as a consequence of the previous analysis, neither equilibrium in the game can be a CME. librium in the CS game. NITS starts by specifying a 'lowest type,' a type with the property that all other types prefer to be revealed as themselves rather than as that lowest type. An equilibrium survives NITS if the lowest type has no incentive to separate, i.e. if the lowest type prefers her equilibrium outcome to the outcome she would get if she could reveal her type. In the general CS game, only the maximum size equilibrium outcome satisfies NITS. The strength of NITS is that it can make predictions under a general monotonicity assumption, and can be justified on the basis of perturbed games with lying averse or nonstrategic players. 15
The prediction of ACDC of Proposition 3 is thus in line with NITS. A difference between NITS and ACDC is that NITS assumes that only the lowest type can separate herself. Hence, according to NITS, the most informative equilibrium is (equally) stable regardless of b. According to ACDC, also other types can separate through credible deviations. As a consequence, it predicts that the stability of the maximum size equilibrium is decreasing in the bias parameter b, and if b is large, the maximum size equilibrium may not be all that stable. The experimental data discussed in the previous section provides support for this prediction.
Other Experimental Results
Here we discuss the experimental work on equilibrium selection in cheap talk games, in addition to that in the CS game, which we discussed in section 2.3. Blume, DeJong, Kim & Sprinkle (2001) provide an experimental analysis of 4 discrete cheap talk games, in which they compare the predictive power of refinements as neologism proofness, influentiality and ex-ante efficiency with PCI. 15 A challenge for NITS is that it cannot be applied easily in cheap talk games that have no clear lowest type. For instance, in Game A, the lowest type cannot easily be defined. In section 4.2, we discuss a game that has many NITS equilibria.
Discrete games
They find that PCI is a reliable predictor of when communication takes place and that the equilibrium refinements sometimes but not always improve on PCI.
In their Games 1 and 3, the predictions of PCI and neologism proofness (and ACDC) are very much aligned, and borne out by the data. In their Game 2 (see Table 3 ) neologism proofness predicts complete separation while the finest partition consistent with PCI entails partial separation. The data are in line with separation, as a clear majority of 88% of the outcomes is consistent with the separating equilibrium. One could argue that this result does not contradict PCI, because PCI allows multiple patterns including separation (see their footnote 10). As the authors note (in footnote 19), one needs to add neologism proofness to PCI to actually predict that separation happens. Consequently, its ACD is 1 (500 0) (500 0) (500 0) 7 3 800 500 500 8 . So ACDC predicts that the partially separating equilibrium will be the most observed equilibrium outcome but that it will not be completely stable.
In line with this prediction, Blume et al. find that 37% of the outcomes are consistent with the partially separating equilibrium but no outcome is consistent with the pooling equilibrium. Thus, of the two equilibria, the one with the lowest ACD performs best. Consistent with the ACD measures, much fewer outcomes are in line with the equilibrium selected by ACDC in game 4 than in game 2. In line with the fact that types 1 t have a credible neologism, they turn out to be the ones that are able to credibly identify themselves.
Our conclusion is that our ACDC concept improves the predictions of neologism proofness and that it does at least as well as PCI in explaining the data of Blume, DeJong, Kim & Sprinkle (2001) . The extra mileage for ACDC with respect to PCI comes from continuous games like the CS game and the vetothreat game which we discuss in the next section. PCI fails to predict any communication at all in these settings, while in accordance with ACDC subjects are able to communicate meaningfully to a large extent.
ACDC in a veto-threat game
In De Groot Ruiz, Onderstal & Offerman (2012a), we test ACDC in fresh experiments. For this, we use games that belong to a class of veto-threat games introduced in De Groot Ruiz, Onderstal & Offerman (2012b) . These games are suitable to test ACDC, as they allow for a continuous manipulation of the size and frequency of credible deviations and can have a rich equilibrium set that is difficult to refine. In Appendix B, we show that ACDC, when adapted for vetothreat games, selects a unique equilibrium in this class of games.
We briefly discuss our results for four treatments (see Table 4 ). Each treatment is a variation of the following game. (2012a), we find that the data supports the predictions of ACDC. As can be seen in Figure 2 , the higher the ACD, the higher the prediction error of an equilibrium. In particular, we find that in each treatment the partially separating equilibrium performs significantly better than the pooling equilibrium. In addition, we find that for B = 130 the partially separating equilibrium performs very similar as when B = 120, supporting the notion than stability is a continuous characteristic. Finally, we find that the partially separating equilibrium performs significantly better for B = 120 or B = 130 than for B = 210.
Finally, treatment T5 has B=120, ( ) 0 R U and ( , ) 30.
The corresponding game has a continuum of size-2 and size-3 equilibria. None of the earlier refinements selects a unique equilibrium. Even influentiality (selecting the equilibrium with the maximum size) does thus not identify a unique equilibrium 16 The deviation correspondence of the pooling equilibrium (the most interesting case), for instance, contains only message strategies with three messages (say 'low', 'medium' and 'high') . In any Receiver strategy in this correspondence, the Receiver proposes 0 after 'low', 0 or 45 after 'medium' and some higher action after 'high'; furthermore, the correspondence will contain the strategy in which the Receiver proposes 45 after 'medium.' Hence, type t = 45 will separate and send 'medium' in any best response to a full-support strategy of the Receiver. Because the deviation correspondence only contains message strategies with three messages, it will not converge to either equilibrium. A similar reasoning holds for the separating equilibrium. 17 The main reason is that the highest Sender-type of a partition-element always prefers the Receiver to believe that the upper boundary is higher than the true boundary (except for types 0 t or t B ). Finally, the 'partition' 0 and (0, ] B is not PCI, as 0 (which is the best response if the Sender is 0) is also a best response to some Receiver-beliefs with support on the interval (0, 1] . 18 All types in [0, 60] (2012a), we find that the ACD of an equilibrium predicts well relative to other equilibria and that the ACDC equilibrium has the lowest prediction error.
Conclusion
ACDC generalizes refinements based on credible deviations, in particular neologism proofness, capturing the behaviorally relevant aspects of equilibrium stability in cheap talk games. ACDC is based on the intuition that the frequency and size of credible deviations affects equilibrium stability in a continuous rather than a binary manner. ACDC measures the (in)stability of cheap talk equilibria and determines which are most plausible. We showed that an ACDC equilibrium exists under general conditions and that it is unique in a large range of applications. Most importantly, the predictions of ACDC organize the data of 
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof proceeds as follows. First, we obtain closed-form solutions for the ACD for all b. Second, we calculate the ACD for the specified values of b.
The ACD of equilibrium in the CS game is equal to 
As noted in the main text, an equilibrium of size n can have a neologism in the beginning 0 n a , a neologism at the end n n a and at most 1 n neologisms in the middle, , Let n b be the size-n equilibrium of the game with bias parameter b . Then, the ACD of the pooling equilibrium is 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 ( ) ( , , ,0, ) ( ,1).
b ACD h b a a h b
The ACD of the maximum-size equilibrium is , ( ( )); , ( ( )); ( , ) ( Proposition 5 Under assumptions (10) and (11), the unique ACDC equilibrium is the maximum size equilibrium with the highest equilibrium action.
For the proof of Proposition 5, we introduce some definitions and results from 
